What is the history of pact-making in South Africa? What is the nature and form of these pacts given the reality that ‘South Africa’ was founded by imperialist interests? And how have these interests, developing as they did as a result of international Capitalist expansion over time, impacted on the form and nature of resistance against its domestic manifests?
The 1989 SACP document entitled Path To Power argues that ‘In the oppression, dispossession and exploitation of blacks, British imperialism and Afrikaner nationalism found common ground. This was the basis for the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910.’ The Afrikaners were, however, the junior partners in this arrangement while British Capital determined the flow of capital inside and outside the State. But in less than 30 years these circumstances changed
By the late 1920’s to early 1930’s, the question of the ‘poor white’ problem came to challenge this 1910 arrangement. As British Capital retained economic power, urban Afrikaner intellectuals used this problem to catapult Afrikaner Nationalism in gaining political power. By 1948 this was achieved. To this extent, the apartheid regime was a reaction to capitalist trends.
After the displacement of British State power in 1948, over time, British capital and Afrikaner Nationalism fused together such that by the 1960’s, at the height of one of the highest growth point of the South African economy, the concept ‘white monopoly capital’ came to refer to the interconnectedness of the political and economic power of both the British and the Afrikaner. By this time Afrikaner Nationalism had effectively become a hegemonic power such that Apartheid South Africa was, in some circles, referred to as a socialist State (for the white minorities of course). What I mean here is that Afrikaner Nationalism had become a senior partner in their relationship with British capital because of its ability to direct the flow of investment capital on the basis of its political objectives.
Welded together by white privilege and supremacy, a ruling class was created.
Inadvertently, the merger of British and Afrikaner capital ensured that the ruling class’s political representatives had to appeal to a constituency beyond the tribal impulses of Afrikaner nationalism. This appeal was however premised on limiting the entry of Black labour into fully expressing itself in the urban polity. And so inevitably, the 30 or so odd years of this merger created conditions for the disassembling of apartheid. This is hardly surprising because the fixed character of apartheid logic rubbed against the expansionist rationality of South African capitalism.
And given the wide-ranging imperialist interests in South Africa, the many liberation movement-led international isolation campaigns and the internal contradictions of the political economy of apartheid, these created important splits within the ruling class. That by the mid 1970’s and early 1980’s, the 1948 arrangement was challenged. This is because the changing nature of capitalist advances in the 1970’s, with the global shift from unskilled to skilled labour, the apartheid project, representatives of Capital argued, ran against the interests of the market.
Nonetheless, by 1987, “four companies (Anglo American, Sanlam, SA Mutual and Rembrandt) alone controlled 80 per cent of all shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Of these companies, Anglo American alone controlled 55 per cent.’ On the other hand, ‘State corporations in some of the key sectors – armaments, energy and transport – play a central role in propping up the entire capitalist economy’. By this time, ‘Afrikaner-controlled monopoly conglomerates developed, and their interests interlocked and merged with those of the older monopolies traditionally controlled by English-speaking whites’. It is this capitalist formation that is said to have held talks with the ANC years before official negotiations. But it must be emphasized that while compromises were inevitable, other compromises were averted.
Nevertheless, corporate South Africa could not commit to the apartheid project. They wanted to commit to a democratic project. But of course, this was because of their profit-seeking motives!
Twenty two years into democracy, South Africa may again be at a tipping point of reconfiguring political pacts.
On the other end of the racial divide is Black Nationalism. Within the constellation of the then broad liberation movement, there were those who espoused a radical tradition and those who advanced a moderate position. The PAC reflected the former while the ANC, together with others, reflected the latter. For the ANC’s part, its observation of the evolution of South African apartheid capitalism led it in the late 1960’s and 1970’s to draw on a broader, but minimum, program of working with various organisations who were against the regime. In part, this was to avoid ultra-left groups which wanted instant socialism but also to avoid ultra-nationalist or chauvinist groups which had the potential to divide the all-encompassing anti-apartheid mood.
Therefore tactically, the ANC’s ideological outlook was necessarily inclusive as it had to appeal to a broad constituency. As the anti-thesis to the apartheid project, the ANC took a number of decisions to itself become the vision it saw for a democratic South Africa. So as the moderates secured a negotiated settlement’, 1994 represented this birthing of a broad front incorporating in our preamble to the Constitution the following: ‘We, the people of South Africa, recognise the injustices of our past’: effectively, both black and white had a political home in ‘South Africa’.
So South Africa 1994 was inevitably a pact between an inclusive African nationalism, represented by the ANC State, and a profit-seeking white monopoly capital, deprived of State power, but represented by big business with strong international (read metropole) networks. As white monopoly capital was allowed to expand, it was also protected by constitutional guarantees. In the main, the ANC State was left to carry out a redistributive program on its own. The economic policy, GEAR, was the outcome of this balancing act.
Therefore, it’s important to note that 1994 did not create a ruling class.
As such, BEE and Affirmative Action essentially became an attempt at incorporating an emergent black Capital class but within the confines of the Constitution. Unavoidably, given the ANC’s historic promises, this pact was never going to be sustainable. In the immediate democratic years, when the economy was characterised by ‘jobless growth’, space for ultra-left and ultra-nationalist groups to contest the political arena opened up.
Let’s recap for a moment
Given the above, we can roughly discern 20 year cycles of continuous reconfigurations of political arrangements: the 1930’s challenge of the 1910 pact, which took another 20 years or so for the challenges of the 1930’s to conclude on the 1948 deal. Then the 1970’s challenge of the 1948 pact which brought SA a new pact in 1994. And now this generation’s challenge of the 1994 political arrangement. Like the early 1930’s period of the ‘poor white’ problem, the persisting dispossession against the Black majority opens up space for ultra-nationalist groups to determine the discourse (or reaction) to the inequalities which South Africa’s capitalist framework creates.
But this reaction didn’t start here. Let me outline three contemporary moments in which one can discern challenges against the 1994 pact.
Firstly…
The almost insurrectionary community protests occurring immediately after democratic local government was installed, were managed, in part, because of the perceived ethical political leadership. So when this period was typified by ‘austerity protests’ and concepts such as ‘popular illegalities’ which characterised unlawful electricity connections and high unemployment, there was a sense of the road ahead. Agree or disagree with the political leadership. And though these were unguided drifts into militancy and populism, ultra-left impulses were dominant in these protests. Needless to say, they shook the ‘integrity’ of the GEAR project.
Secondly…
In an attempt to reverse the effects of the ‘1996 Class project’ of white monopoly capture, which GEAR was said to represent when it was introduced in 1996, the 2007 Polokwane Conference essentially became a revanchist program to recoup the 1994 political moment. Part of this, it was argued, would address a number of issues which emanated from community protests. As such, in capturing the levers of power, the Polokwane shift paved the way for an expansionary fiscal policy which was adopted to i) curb the excesses of the global economic and financial crisis by ii) driving an aggressive national redistributive program.
As part of its attempt at consolidating the 2007 shift, this project also involved the COPE, EFF breakaway and the NUMSA’s breakaway from COSATU. Its modus operandi proved itself in the Marikana massacre in which negotiations were summarily shut down and the resultant struggle, much like the Feesmustfall protest of 2016, was falsely pit between the striking miners (protesting student) and the police.
Out of this consolidation lies one significant issue. From the fall of NUM, which precipitated the marikana strikes, the changing political economy of South Africa is discernible. For instance, the influence of the mining industry waned down while the influence of the service industry shot up. The financial, real estate and business service sector accounted for 22% of the country’s GDP in 2013 and, together with other services sectors, has proved to be a pillar of the country’s economic growth over the years. This makes the sector an influential player in the country’s political objectives. The investment and banking sector in the economy are all the more crucial in furthering these objectives: the mobilisation of investment capital to strategic industries, the decision to grant mortgages and other type of loans and their associated costs, and the spatial location of infrastructure, among many others, is by and large determined by this sector and in a more sustainable manner than the State. In many of these transactions, employment is at the heart of these activities. So as long as the control and flow of money and investment activity doesn’t echo the country’s political objectives, the country will continue to be on this crossroad.
On the other hand, in 2013, mining and quarrying only accounted for 5% of GDP. This may, however, be offset by an increase in the downstream or beneficiated minerals industry, which the government has targeted as a growth sector. But this requires clarity of policy, political steadiness and collective agreement across the board.
And thirdly…
The #Rhodesmustfall and #Feesmustfall movements, RMF and FMF, respectively, which began in 2015, have captured the collective imagination of the country. In sharp contrast to community struggles, curiously, ultra-nationalist impulses are a dominant feature of these student movements. Further, the 2016 student struggles have come with the added thrust of violence inside and outside the ‘university’. ‘University’ because as the movement grows, there is growing little political distinction between outside and inside the ‘university’. The ‘university’ will no longer be the organising institution for student demands, and the collective dissatisfaction of students has the potential to morph into a full blown national political campaign. Sisonke Msimang captured this moment as the ‘death of compromise in South Africa’ in which South Africa is ‘in a new phase, one that is characterized by a rejection of compromise as a tactic for managing democratic’ transitions. In which South Africa is ‘witnessing radicalism and intransigence as a modus operandi across our society.’
These three moments and their implications are important given the historical cycles outlined earlier. And though 1994 didn’t create a ruling class, concepts such as ‘patriotic bourgeois’ were indications by the State to create a black capitalist class that would align investment activities with political objectives. But also given their hegemonic influence in media, the dominance of white monopoly capital would not easily be displaced.
So what’s at stake here?
The split between different fractions of Capital (grossly demarcated between Western and Eastern capital with domestic capital facilitating partnership with one or the other) in South Africa makes this moment a fertile ground for another pact making. And so if Msimang is to be correct, that we are ‘witnessing radicalism and intransigence as a modus operandi across our society’, will the radical, ultra-nationalist, current reign over all fractions of capital and gain the hegemonic ground? Or will this current work with a fraction of capital to eclipse the dominance of the other fraction?
Alternatively, will fractions of Capital bandy together, identify a pliable political figure to dominate the political arena, and secure their interests? Perhaps these questions could be asked differently: Given the electoral dominance of the moderates, can the radical, ultra-nationalist, currents shift the ANC to curb the excesses of South African capitalism and reorientate the economy towards a radical path? And if this proves impossible because of splints within the ANC, will a faction within the party collaborate with a fraction of capital to restore the dominance of the 1994 deal or vice versa? Or will the other faction within the ANC work with another fraction of capital for dominance over the economy?
These are all crucial questions because each question captures the operational impulses present in the crisis which engulfs us all. However we move forward, these struggles will be accompanied by a realignment of the political establishment and inevitably of the economic establishment. In the meantime, we are in for another decade or two of uncertainty, but, whoever gains the moral high ground among these contesting factions will be secured a seat at the next negotiating table.